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Chapter 6

M others, Other M others,
and Others
The Legal Challenges and Contradictions
of Lesbian Parents
Shelley A.M. Gavigan

Introduction
My title derives its inspiration in part from the end-of-day watch sounded for

my daughter by another child at her day-care centre when I arrived to pick her
up:'. . . your mo1n's here-the other one.' As I think back to tha t moment more
than half a decade ago, I remember with fondness the ease with which my
daughter's little friends were able to assimilate that she didn't have a daddy,
but rather two mommies-even the competitive little girl who said, 'Oh yeah,
well I have about 10 mommies.'
Too, I recall a yet earlier conversation with one of my feminist intellectual
heroes (who was then on the cusp of a post-modern turn). I shared with my
colleague that I found it interesting yet odd that I, a lawyer turned legal academic, did not have what I regarded as a legal relations hip with the new baby in
my life. My colleague responded that perhaps that was a good thing, perhaps
that was better; after all, why would I want to, need to, acquiesce to law 's
power to define and regulate. To be frank, as unsettled as I was by the contradictory nature of my own position, I was troubled by her respo nse. I mu ttered
my well-worn rejoinder th at I thought legal relations and regulation were more
complicated than that.
In the years following th is conversation, as Brenda Cossman (1994) has
noted elsewhere, brave lesbians and gay men are now taking their lives to
court to challenge and resist homophobic discrimination. A community of
people who scarcely, if ever, experienced the law as a shield has taken it up as
a sword to advance and vindicate equality claims. To even the most casual
observer, the successes and near misses of lesbian and gay litigants and law
reformers illustrate that a significant social and political shift has been
achieved over the last decade. In this shift, lesbians and gay n1en have
savoured victories as of ten as they have endured defeats. To be sure, not every
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lesbian litigant would embrace the characterization of 'success' or 'victory'. In
some of the litigation where lesbian former partners have squared off against
each other, one lesbian's victory has been another lesbian's loss. Even more
amazing, out lesbian and gay lawyers are appearing as counsel in some of
these cases. Of this phenomenon, Laura Benkov h as suggested that 'the past
and present are colliding in the courtroom· (1994: 37). These are interesting
times in which to be a stud ent of law, gender relations, and social change.
There are, nonetheless, notes of caution to be sounded at the prospect of
litigating one's way to social transformat ion. I count myself numbered among
those who are dubious about the nature and endurance of the successes that
can be experienced in the courtroom (Gavigan, 1992; see also Fu dge. 1991;
Glasbeek, 1989; Fudge and Glasbeek, 1992).
In this chapter, 1consider what is meant wh en we think of law as a 'genderi ng strategy' (Sma rt, 1992) in relation to lesbian parents and the varied
relations and encounters with law that lesbians with child ren have. I identify
and engage critically with two themes in lesbian legal scholarship: (1) that
lesbians are 'outside' the law, and (2) that lesbian n1others are mothers just
like other mothers. I examine four different forms of lesbian child custody
litigation to illustrate that the characterization of 'inside/outside' the law does
not fully capture the complexity of lesbians in relation to the law, as well as to
illustrate the complexity (and not infrequently the fragility) of lesbian relationships to children in their lives. In this chapter, then, I hope to illustrate the
importance of theorizing Jaw when theorizing its contribution to gender
relations, and lesbian engagement with both .

Theme I : Lesbians Inside/Outside Law?
At the outset, 1 concede that I find troubling many themes in lesbian writing
and scholarship in relation to law, and here I include my own modest contribution to the literature. One then1e in lesbian writing about law is that lesbians
are 'outside' the law (Arnp, 1995; Robson, 1992). The evocative cri de coeur
of the prominent American lesbian essayist, Mi nnie Bruce Pratt-'how I love is
outside the J aw ' (1991: 228; cited by Arnup, 1995: 378)-is powerful, haunting, almost irresistible. My response (rather too cryptic, I now see) has been to
assert: 'Lesbians do not live outside the law in a ki nd of legal limbo, nor do
they exist in a legal vacuum. They shape and are shaped by the legal and social
relations in which they live' (Gavigan, 199Sa: 103) .
In this chapter, I hope to illustrate that both positions need to be revisited,
rethought. Af ter all, lesbians who have been married, lesbians who have had
children with men, and lesbians who have given birth to children or who have
adopted children-t hese lesbians are not 'outside the Jaw'. They can't 'opt out'
(Brophy and Smart, 1985: 1) . They live in relation to law; even when they leave
the marriages, their legal relationships do not end. Rather than have her
children dragged through an ugly custody battle at the instance of their father
(with her moth er as a character witness for him). Minnie Bruce Pratt (1991:
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231) left them with him, 'reclaiming' her relationship with them when they
were older:
I could have stolen them and run away to a place where no one knew them,
no one knew me, hidden them, and tried to find work under some other name
than my own. I could not justify taking them from all their kin, or their father
in this way. Instead, from this marriage I carried away my clothes, my books,
some kitchen utensils, two cats. I also carried away the conviction that I had
been th rust out into a place of terrible loss by laws laid down by men. In my
grief, and in my ignorance of the past of others, I felt that no one had
sustained such a loss befo re. . . . I became obsessed with justice. (Ibid., 44-S)
When Minnie Bruce Pratt made the excruciating decision not to challenge her
husband's assertion of custody of their sons, she had been snared already in
the complex sticky web of family and law that touches every married woman
and mother.
But for some lesbians, it may be possible to say: 'How I love (and whom I
love) is outside the law.' And here, I am thinking of some of the cases
involving American lesbians who have been told by former partners or their
families, and then by the courts, that they are not parents to the children they
have been raising. In legal terms, these lesbians, and some others who have
attempted to adopt their partners' children, are told that they do not have
'standing'-no legal interest in or right to assert in relation to the children.
They are not mothers; they are not parents. Their relationships do not amount
to parental or familial relations. But, as I will illustrate below, even this
is subject to challenge and change; the law here is uneven.
Another implicit theme in feminist legal literature suggests that lesbians
have been constructed as the archetypical bad mothers of legal discourse, and
as a result, always at risk in the face of a disapprovi ng legal system (e.g.,
Arnup, 1989, 1995). In her recent explication of the shifting nature of maternalist ideology in law, Susa n Boyd has carefully analysed how three important
·access' issues in child custody litigation have been articulated. And while the
issue of sexual orientation in access is not central to her piece, Boyd intimates
that law's fear of single mothers means th at lesbians can anticipate 'harsher
evaluations' by judges (1996a: 504). However, while the obsessive fury of
husbands often seems insatiable, recent experiences of lesbians in Canadian
courtrooms suggest less predictable, less certain results.
It seems to me that we can no longer assert generally or with confidence that
lesbians are in or out of the law or on the wrong side of the legal tracks; it is
import ant to identify, illustrate, and analyse the varied and changing, indeed,
contradictory ways in which the law relates to lesbians and lesbians to the law.
Important shifts, and the not infrequent victory, however partial, fragile, and
costly it may be, need to be acknowledged (and understood). Some of the cases
I discuss below are illustrative of these shifts and contradictions.
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Theme U: Lesbians 'Unmodified'--Mothers or Parents?

One question that has vexed me before is: 'What makes a woman a mother?'
(Gavigan, I 995a: 107). Here I modify i t to ask: 'What makes a lesbian a
mother?' Are lesbians 'mothers just like others' (Arnup, 1989)? Always? The
commentary on the earliest reported lesbian custody cases stressed, in the face
of patriarchal wrath and judicial apprehension, that lesbian mothers were not
demons but mothers, 'just like others'. The importance of this contribution
cannot be overstated; Amup broke lesbian ground in feminist legal literature at
a time when few scholars and lawyers could bring themselves to say the word
'lesbian' out loud. However, new and emerging forms of litigation indicate that
many lesbian mothers are not like other mothers: th ere are no fathers or
husbands, no lesbian mothers being aspersed because of their sexual orientation, but rather two women who have come together or who have come apart.
But what does it mean to have two mothers? The language of 'mother' is
seldom unmodified: birth 1nother, adoptive mother, real 1nother, bad mother,
good mother, lesbian mother. . . . The term 'mothe r' implicitly invites invocation of the term 'father', as if this dyad is natural and inevi ta ble. that a child
must have one of each. Lesbian couples involved in parenting and child-rearing
themselves seem to cede some primacy to the (birth/ natural/real) mother : the
non-birth/' social' mother may be called the co-m other (Williams. 1995: 109),
the other mother (Adams. 1995; Nelson. 1996: 85). the second mother
(Fleming, 1995), the co-mom (Czyscon, l 995) , step-parent (Rounthwaite and
Wynne, 1995: 87), or stepmother (Nelson, 1996:84). Where a child was born
or adopted into a lesbian relationship, t he women seem to regard themselves
as mothers and other mothers. When the child comes w ith the mot her from a
previ ous, usually straight, relationship, the other woman may become 'coparent' or 'co-mom'. The age and acceptance of the child and th e nature of the
father's involvement may also shape t h e lesbian co-parent's relationship with
the child or children (see, e.g., Rounthwaite and ·wynne, 1995). A recent case
in Ontario (Buist v. Greaves, 1997). which I will discuss below, has pushed this
issue one step further, by testing the meaning of 'mother ' in the Children's Law
Reform Act. 1

Engenderi ng Law
Law as a Gendering Strategy

In the i naugural issue of the journal Social and Legal Studies, Carol Smart
(1992) argued th at feminist socio-legal scholars ought to shift their inqu iry
f rom earlier .modes and levels of analysis to think now of law as gende red
(rather than male or sexist) . This analytic distinction is important, she urged,
because 'the idea of it as gendered allows us to think of [law] in terms of
processes which will work in a variety of ways and in which there is no relentless assumpt ion that whatever it does exploits women and serves men' (1992:
33; emphasis added). It is more complicated than that. This has long been a
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theme in Smart's work (1981, 1985), and her insights have been important and
influential for many of us in Canada. In this chapter, I take up Smart's invitation to examine 'How does gender work in law and how does law work to
produce gender' and to think of law as a 'gendering strategy ' (1992: 35). This
forn1of inquiry, combined with Smart 's appreciation of the uneven nature and
develop ment of legal regulation (Smart, 1986) and her injunction against
feminist instrumentalist analyses, is clearly a fruitful way to proceed.
One of Jaw's contributions to gender relations, Smart argued, is the 'woman
of Legal Discourse': the 'gendered subject position which legal discourse brings
into being· (1992: 34) . It is here where my depanure from Smart begins to
form. Smart is careful to attempt to avoid ascribing (to borrow fromCain, 1994:
44) 'causal primacy' to legal discourse: she characterizes law as 'partial author'
(1992: 39). Nonetheless, her illustrative exemplar (the bad mother) belies her
own critique of less sophisticated forms of feminist legal analysis.
The category of bad mother, per Smart, came into being with the enactment
of draconian criminal legislation that captured 'lewd women' whose newborn
infants were found dead. These apparently reluctant moth ers were presumed by
operation of this statute to have murdered their newborn infants unless they
could produce two witnesses to provide evidence to the contrary (21Jae.I c.27
(1603)) . This statute was repealed in 1803 by the same statute (Lord
Ellenborough's Act, 43 Geo.III (1803) ) that made abortion at any stage of
pregnancy a statutory felony, thus capturing women, married or otherwise, who
were trying to avoid motherhood (Gavigan, 1984). Smart (1992: 38) delineates
pieces of legislation that not only ·constructed a category of dangerous moth erhood' bu t also widened 'the net of law .. . at precisely the same time as it made
it increasingly difficult to avoid unmarried pregnancy and childbirth.' There are
a number of difficulties with Smart's analysis, not the least of which is the
uneasy fit her discursi ve exempla r, the bad mother, has with her theoretical
imperative. In other words, Smart's explication of the sixteenth-, eighteenth,
and nineteenth-century statutes does not illuminate legal 'processes which . . .
work in a variety of ways and in which there is no relentless assumption that
whatever [law] does exploits women and serves men' (ibid ., 33) . In fact, a
broader and closer analysis of the 'dangerous' mothers of infanticide law
reveals that this 'legal category' in practice was always unstable and imperfectly
implemented: juries often refused to convict young women indicted and many
nineteenth-century judg es expressed sympathy for them (Backhouse, 1984b;
Gavigan, 1984). Medico-legal experts devised 'scientific' tests to determine
whether or not the infant, whose birth had been concealed and whose death
was alleged to have been caused by maternal murder, had breathed or not-if
not, th e unmarried woman was not caught by the statute (Gavigan, 1984).
Leav ing aside my own view that a category of (bad) Woman of legal discourse
might better be illustrated by the experience of unmarried women under the
English Poor Law (Thane, 1978) or by the women who were convicted of petit
treason when they killed their husbands (and who experienced scant judicial or
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public mercy when they were burned at the stake) (Gavigan. 1989-90). l do
have a deeper theoretical concern: Smart examines only one level of law (legislation). defines it as 'legal discourse', and th us imposes closure, offering but a
partial image of that of which law is but a partial author.
This observation of the contradictory images of women in legal and medicolegal discourses, even in the same area of law, is not novel. In her early work
on the legal construction of women's sexuality, Susan Edwards (1981) illustrated quite contradictory images of female sexuality in sexual offences: that of
female sexual passivity in sexual of fence legislation and female sexual precip·
itation in the legal process. Even in this manifestly gendered area of criminal
law, there is no one Woman in the legal discourse.
Thus, l am concerned that the much criticized 'Woman· of conventional
feminist discourse has been replaced by Smart's 'Woman of legal discourse',
notwithstanding her own disclaimer: 'It is this Woman of legal discourse that
feminism must continue to deconstruct but without creating a normative
Woman who reimposes a homogeneity which is all too often cast in our own
privileged, white likeness' (Smart, 1992: 39).
While I accept her admonition, I find Smart's notion of legal discourse to be
too discursively unidirectional and her Woman of legal discourse to be discursively unidimensional (and relentlessly exploited as a heterosexual woman) .
Constituted as she is by {legal) discourse. she has neither experience nor
agency: she has neither breath nor breadth. In the film A Simple Wish, Ruby
Dee's character was rendered cartoonishly unidimensional by the flick of a
hand of Kathleen Turner's wicked fairy godmother. Smart 's Woman of legal
discourse similarly owes her flattened fate to the somethin.g that has been done
to her in the 'Toon Town' of legal discourse.
Again to be clear, I accept much of Sm art's theoretical contribution. An
atten1pt to identify. appreciate. and illustrate the complex, uneven, contradic·
tory, and materially significant nature of law and of family, and of gender
inequalities, informs my work (Gavigan, 1992, 1993) . In particular, I continue
to be interest ed in identifying the imases of women in legal discourses and
practices. These images, including the images of lesbians, are as uneven,
incomplete, complex, and contradictory as the law itself. In my interrogation
of the various lesbian parenting cases, will I find the 'Lesbian of legal
discourse'? ls there a gendered subject position of lesbian or lesbian parent
constituted by law? l hope to illustrate, with the aid of Smart's theoretical
prescription (if not her illustration). legal relations and legal processes that
'work in a variety of ways and in which there is no relentless assumpti on that
whatever [Jaw] does exploits' lesbians.
Law as Practice, Process, and Institution

The discourse of law does not correspond with everyday thought except in
those areas of life such as the stock exchange where the legal form has consti·
tuted what is everyday. (Cain, 1994: 40-1)
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Access to justice may be defined most narrowly as access to the courts. The
words uttered in judgment by a court are the product of litigation. The cost of
access to justice through litigation is prohibitive to all but the most financially
secure litigant.2 Family law, as traditionally practised, is costly to private
litigants and legal aid plans alike. Unlike criminal defence work, family law is
'paper-intensive'3 and thus expensive. This may explain in part what Brenda
Cossman and Carol Rogerson (1997: 785) found in their recent study:
With the exception of child protection cases, the majority of family law cases
are not litigated to a resolution. Anecdotally, it is said that between 90 and 95
percent of family law cases settle at some point in the process prior to a trialwhether by an agreement between the parties negotiated by their lawyers
without recourse to the courts, or by minutes of settlement incorporated into
a consent order after litigation has been comn1enced, in some cases prior to
the hearing of the first motion or in others after the first motions, or after a
settlement or pre-trial conference.
Access to the courts via litigation is also a question of access to resources,
which, for many women, are diminishing with the evisceration of legal aid
plans. Thus, we have a fraction of private family law cases actually litigated
and resulting in a judicial pronouncement, and fewer still reported. The cases,
reported or not, that go to trial are those that defy (or in which at least one
party defies) settlement.
Susan Boyd has noted with concern that one problem with legal academic
research focusing on reported cases in family law is that most reported cases
involve white people. Boyd (1996a: 498) considers that perhaps this m ay derive
in part from the fact th at 'white people may feel more comfortable tha n people
of colour resorting to th e court system to resolve family disputes.' Yet, surely
few litigants go willingly or happily to court and fewer still savour any measure
of comfort from the process. Who has the resources to participate in the legal
process, who takes whom to court, and who accepts the legitimacy of judicial
determinations seem more releva nt here. In this process, gender, race, and
class, power and money, and not infrequently our old friend the state are implicated. For instance, in April 1997, family court judges reported to the Ontario
Legal Aid Review that fully 50 per cent of litiga tion in matters of child support
and child protection is instituted by the state (Ontario Legal Aid Review, I,
1997: 801) . And, as Minnie Bruce Pratt (1991: 44) learned. one can experience
legal 'process' without ever going to court:
I was judged wi th finality. Witho ut my climbing the steps of the courtrooms
of Cumberland County, I was sentenced. Without facing the judge since my
lawyer feared that 'calling attention to my lesbian identity' would mean that I
would never see my children again, I was declared dirty, polluted, unholy. I
was not to have a home with my children again. I did not die, but the agony
was as bitter as death. . . .
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At the heart of this is the very nature of an adversari al legal system in which
(formally equal) litigants co1nmence their actions and define their issueswhere these litigants want to win. The courtroom is a site less of principle than
of tactics, where perceived weaknesses in either party are exploited by the
other. In all of this, the influential role of lawyers as litigators cannot be
overstated. The courtroom is the home playing field not only of judges, but of
legal advocates, whose practice it is to translate and transform social and
persona l struggles and issues into legal discourse (Cain, 1994; Glasbeek, 1989) .
It is a lawyer who advises the lesbian litigant not to use the word 'lesbian' in
her affidavit, and it surely is a lawyer who advises an avenging renegade
husband to sprinkle liberally t h e word 'lesbian' tl1roughout his own affidavit.
Just add 'lesbian', stir, and hope for the best. It is th e lawyer who advises the
lesbian mother how 'out' to be or not be if she wants to win. And th us, it is
often the lawyer who lacks the courage to 'raise fearlessly every issue'4 on
behalf of the lesbian litigant or who advises on matters about which she or he
is less than expert.
Considered in this light, it is as much a cause for concern as for celebration
that the ·past and present' collide in the courtroom-a forum in which the
perspectives and experience of past and present are selected, constructed,
tailored, emphasized, and ignored at the instance of the contesting litigants in
their efforts to persuade a trial judge or appellate panel of the 'rightness' of
their position. But, as been argued elsewhere (see, e.g., Greenwood and Young,
1976; Thompson, 1975; Hay, 1975; Smart, 1981; Gavigan, 1988, 1992; Chunn
and Gavigan, 1988), and as I have argued above and hope to illustrate below,
the law is filled with con tradicti ons; it is nei ther unidimensional n or
monol i thic.

Lesbians and Their (Legal) Relat ions
Lesbians find themselves in four legal contexts in family court. These four
contexts are not finite or exhaustive. Indeed, at the risk of appearing to invoke
an essentialist image of lesbians, I am inclined to the v iew that the range of
contexts is perilously close to infinite given the complexity and diversity of
political and interpersonal possibilities that characterize lesbian lives.
Lesbians in (Heterosexual) Family Court

Lesbian and gay custody cases in which straight (former) spouses use sexual
orientation as a weapon and in voke dominant notions of appropriate parenting
reveal as much about the social mean ing attached to biological and social
parenting as they do about the wrath of the 'straight spouse spurned '. The use
of 'lesbian' and/or 'sexual orientation' as a weapon hearkens back to an earlier
legal era when 'fault ' was an expressly relevant factor in matrimonial causes,
such as divorce. In divorce proceedings, evidence of matrimonial 'misconduct'
or the commission of a 'matrimonial offence' could establish grounds for
divorce; this evidence was also relevant with respect to collateral issues, such
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as support and custody. A wife who had deserted her husband or who had
committed adultery was not entitled to support. Until 1968, a wife's homosexuality in and of itself could not support a husband's divorce petition; however,
it could be drawn in under the rubric of cruelty. When the federal Divorce Act5
was enacted in 1968, the grounds for divorce were broadened considerably.
Many matrimonial 'offences' committed since the celebration of a marriage
(includ ing having 'engaged in a homosexual act') were articulated in s. 3 to
support a divorce petition, and even the 'marriage breakdown' provision
entrenched the significance of fault: the person who deserted t he marriage had
to wait five years before being able to petition for divorce-s. 4(1) (e) (ii); the
deserted spouse could petition after three years-s. 4(l) (e)(i). In 1985 the
Divorce Act6 was amended to eliminate many of the fault-based grounds and
to limit evidence of (bad) conduct, except where relevant to that person's
suitability for custody of children. Despite this attempt at formal inhibition of
allegations of (mis)conduct, some lawyers and their clients continue to be of
the view that they must 'make her look like a tramp' (or worse) in divorce and
custody proceedings.
Susan Boyd has ably illustrated that judicial assumptions about normal
families and lifestyles are firmly rooted. The English case, C. v. C., upon which
she comments, involved custody litigation over a seven-year-old daughter of
whom the mother had been the principal parent and caregiver in the first six
years of the child 's life. Af ter the parents separated, the mother became
involved in two lesbian relationships, the second of which was more significant and lasting. The father remarried, and in his bid for custody argued that
he offered a stable, heterosexua l nuclear family and a bigger house. Each
parent was foun d by the trial judg e to have a loving relationship with their
daughter, and she was happy in both homes. The trial judge indicated , says
Boyd, 'if he could choose between an exclusively heterosexual lifestyle and a
lesbian one, he would favour the "normal'" (1992: 278). But given the close
bond between the mother and child, and the fact that the child would
inevitably learn that her mother was a lesbian, the trial judg e awarded custody
to the mother and access to the father. On appeal, the Court of Appeal allowed
the father's appeal and ordered a new heari ng, which ultimately again
favoured the mother. Boyd draws out the English judg es' uncritical reliance on
their subjective experience and beliefs and she is not comforted by their recita·
lion of the 'now routi ne' declaration that the mother's lesbian relationship was
not conclusive in deciding the appeal.
C. v. C. illustrates the context in which lesbian mothers most often (to date)
find themselves in court defending a custody application by a normal, remarried ex-husband 7 or (less typically in Canada) by the child 's grandparents .8 As
recently as July 1992, the British Columbia Supreme Court released a judgment
in a case (N. v. N.) in which a father relied on the fact of the mother's lesbian
relationship with an RCMP constable to support his ultimately unsuccessful bid
f or custody of their four children. Both parents had been devout members of
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the Salvation Army, and while the trial judge was not certain of the precise
reason for Mrs N 's 'l apse of faith', the in ference drawn by her h usband implicated her sexual identity. The trial judge, while not unsympathe ti c to Mr N .
noted that his 'steadfast and unrelenting reference to the gospels h ad j ust the
opposite effect on Mrs. N than what he had h oped. Mrs. N established a
relationship with another woman' (1992: 3).
The cases involving lesbians and gay men coming out of straight relatio nships reveal much about the gend ered nature of parenting . For instance, in
Canada th e struggles of gay men in relation to their children tend to manifest
themselves in reported cases in which a gay father has separated from his wife
and mother of their children, having wrestled w ith the discovery and/or acceptance (after marriage) of his sexual orientation. Generally, the legal issue here
concerns not custody of the children, but rather his right of access to them. and
more specifically, whether he can have overnight access (see, e.g., W. 11. W.,
1985; D. P.-B. 17. T. P.-B., 1988; Saunders u. Saunders, 1988; Terrzplernan 11.
Templeman, 1986). Can he have them sleep in the same home wh ere he sleeps?
Can h e have his lover sleep in the house, in his room, in his bed, wh en his
child ren are visiting? Can he defeat the assumption t hat overnight access in
these circumstances exposes his children to the 'harmfu l effects of his lifestyle'
(W. v. W , 1985), and where the merits and presumed 'stability of a sexually
orthodox environment' (S. (1.1.) 11. S. (G.E.), 1989) are preferred without
question, challenge, or explanation.
Often, the wife's pain at t he rejection she perceives. and t he disruption she
h as experienced is palpable (e.g., Martini 11. Martini, 1987), but occasionally
th e courts offer us a glimpse of the wid er familial di mensions. In a 1989
decision of the Newfoundland Supreme Cou rt, in which, as a result of the
separation, the wife and child ren became economically dependent on her
parents and lived in their home, th e court expressed a particular concern:
immediate overnight access may have a negat ive affect on the bes t interest of
the children in this particular case. The maternal grandparents have openly
expressed to the children their abhorrence of their father's homosexual
lifestyle. The mother is economically dependent on her parents and she and
the children have no choice bu t to reside wi th them at the present time. I feel
a reasonable time should be given for the grandparents to get used to the idea
th at the father will have overnight access and hopef ully this will give the
mother an opportunity to find alternative living arrangements. (A.E. 11. G.E..
1989: 144)
Husbands, too, continue to hurl the 'lesbian' epithet, both real and
imagined, at their w ives; but they do so with less confidence of vindication by
the judiciary. One husband in Sault Ste Marie (Tomanec v. Tomanec, 1993)
inferred that his wife's refusal to be a 'traditional wife' was conclusive
evidence of both h er lesbianism and her mental illness. The court disagreed
and the wife was awarded custody of the couple's two children. Another suspi-

110 Law as a Genderi ng Practice

cious husband insisted that his wife could be on the way to initiating a lesbian
relationship with their five-year-old daughter (Korniakov v. Komiakov , 1997) .
Judge Main in the Ontario Court, Provincial Division, held that Mr Korniakov
was incorrect in his conclusion. Custody of the couple's two children was
awarded to the mother.
In 1996. the Ontario Court, General Division, was the site of a custody application involving two girls, aged 12 and 13, who had been in their father's
custody for ll years, pursuant to a separation agreement with their mother
(Ouellet v. Ouellet, 1997). The father's current partner had been a 'mother
figure' for the last eight years. Af ter the separation, the mother had two shortlived relationships, which produced two more children, and at the time of the
court hearing, in 1996, she had embarked on her second lesbian relationship.
The girls expressed a preference to li ve with their mother (although one of them
was nervous about what her friends and others would say about her mother
being a lesbian). The mother applied for custody. At the hearing, the mother
and the maternal grandparents commended the father's care of the chil dren and
his ability to facilitate access. The mother won custody, with generous access
to the father. The parties were to work out the details of access between
themselves and were told to return to court in a year if they could not work out
an agreemen t. With respect to the one daugh ter's anxiety about h er mother's
sexual orientation, the court noted, 'There was a need, at the present time, for
support and therapy, if necessary to cope with soci ety's sometimes uneducated
reflection upon their mother's sexual orientation' (1997 WDFL 092).
This case buried in the Weekly Digests of Family Law, is interesting. Here,
we have an almost perfect father who, with his new wife, has raised two girls
for many years. Their mother h as had two other children in the meantime and
is at the beginning of her second lesbian relationship. And still, the court
awarded her custody of the children. Clearly, the age and expressed preference
of the daughters carried weight. But we may be able to infer that the father did
not make an issue of the mother's lifestyle or sexual orientation, and did not
ask the court to either. The positions taken by the parties often shape, if not
determine, the tone and tenor of a judge's judgment.
The wider familial dimensions in a British Columbia adoption case may
open yet another window on the limi ts of acceptance of sexual orientation in
the wider community: here a young lesbian mother was not forced into litigation by her child's father; she did not lose custody of her child to an angry
father. This woman, a single parent, was pressured by her own parents to give
up her child for adoption because of their insistence that as a lesbian she could
not raise a child (Adams v. Woodbury. 1986). Some six weeks later, having
been through counselling, the young mother decided that being a lesbian did
not preclude being a parent; she attempted unsuccessfully to regain custody of
her daughter-over the vigorous objections not of her child's adoptive parents
but of her own parents.
Some of these cases involving the judicial treatment of lesbians and gay men
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who leave straight marriages or w ho run af oul of parents' expectations illustrate what others have noted elsewhere: lesbian and gay parents are at risk in
the courtroom if they do not conform to domina nt notions of appropriate gay
sexual behaviour: quiet and apolitical. But these cases also illustra te the
gendered nature of post-separation parenting: for gay fathers, as with most
fathers, access is their legal issue. Their sexual orientation, as raised by their
spouses, parents, and in-laws, may be constructed in a way that shapes the
kind of access arrangements they may have. With respect to lesbians, custody
of their children continues to be contested and litigated at the instance of the
men who have been left. And, to borrow from Shakespeare, hell frequently
hath no fury like a straight spouse spurned. Yet we also see judges declining to
acquiesce to the husbands and a shift in which judges now not only say that
the mother's sexual orientation is not determinative of the issue in custody, but
some of them actua lly seem to mean it. The fact that they h ave to say it at all,
of course, is due to the fact t hat someone has taken the lesbian mother to
court, h as ref used to settle, and has litigated the issue. The shift? Litigating
husbands can no longer be supremely confident of winning.

Lesbians Take Each Other To Family Court:
Lesbian Mothers and Other Mothers
Not every lesbian relationship lasts forever. So1ne even u nravel with pain, rejection, and recrimination. Some lesbians have resisted the label 'spouse' in order
to avoid responsibility for the children of the relationship. This was the case in
a British Columbia case. Anderson v. Luoma (see Andrews, 1995; Arnup, 1997;
Gavigan, 1995) in which Arlene Luoma successfully eschewed any responsibility for the children who had referred to h er as 'their Arlene'. The legal significance of this case has always been limited, as it was decided under a particular
definition in a piece of BC legislation. More recently, the Supreme Court of
Canada, in M. v. H. (1999) held that the heterosexual definition of spouse (for
the purpose of spousal support) in the Ontario legislation violated M's equality rights under the Cana dian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Arlene Luoma
may well be grateful that she left Penny Anderson where and when she did!
In many provinces, including Ontario, a parent is defined in fa1nily law legislation to include someone who has demonstrated a settled intention to treat a
child as a child of his or h er Own family (i.e., 'social parents').9 In Ontario's
Children's Law Reform Act, 10 a parent or any person may apply for custody or
access to a child-the neutral phrase, 'any person', helping grandparents and
lesbian social parents alike. The significance of the gender-neutrality, and
indeed 'familial-neutrality', of these family law provisions should not be
underestimated or misunderstood. The legislation does not restrict standing in
child custody cases to parents and thus allows 'third parties' to be heard. This
apparently arcane legal point is a matter of some consequence to lesbian social
parents who do not have a biological relationship to a child they may be
parenting with a biological parent.
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In Ontario, recently, a lesbian couple who had separated litigated many
issues as a result of their u nravelled relationship (Buist v. Greaves, 1997). One

of the contested issues between them involved custody of a four-year-old boy
conceived by alternative insemi nation during the course of their relationship.
The biological mother had received an offer of employment in another province
and she proposed to take the little boy with her. Her former partner sought to
prevent her from taking the boy with her. One interesting aspect of this case is
that the social parent asked for a declaration, under s. 4 of the Children's Law
Reform Act, that she, too, was the mother of the child . While she did not want
to displace the biological mother, she sought to have her own relationship t o
the child recognized as that of 'mother' as well. In declining to make the order,
the trial j udge had this to say:
There is no doubt that the relationship . . . is very close; however, [he] does
not consider her his mother. Ms Greaves is his mother. He calls her 'mama'
while he calls Ms Buist 'gaga' which is short for Peggy. He was given Ms G's
last name at birth. (1997 OJ No 2646 at para 35)
While on the facts of this case, the trial judge may well have come to a
conventional and defensible conclusion on the issues of custody (to the biological mother), access (to the social parent), and child support (a modest sum to
be paid by Buist), her route to that conclusion, including her identification of
these indicia of 'mother', is troubling. The appellation of parents in lesbian
households may bear little resemblance to or may not share the same meaning
as in households where the parents are referred to as 'Mommy' and 'Dad dy'.
Similarly, the fact that a child is given the last name of one parent ought not.
in and of itself, be conclusive of anything. If it is, every mother whose child
bears the surname of its father has cause for concern.
The gender- and familial-neutral language of the Ontario legislation allows
lesbians who are not biological parents to assert claims with respect to the
children in their lives. And, while Buist v. Greaves offers an illustration of the
difficulty a lesbian social parent has in asserting an equal claim to motherhood,
she nonetheless has standing to be considered as a child's parent. Neither
outside law nor instances of the quintessential bad woman/mother of legal
discourse, these lesbian cases suggest that finer, more nuanced analytic tools
need to be deployed to explicate the lesbian victories and lesbian d efeats
experienced here.
Other Mothers and Others: Surviving Lesbian
(Social) Parents Meet Others in Family Court

Lesbian parenting cases, combining as they do birth and adoption, fostering
and social parenting, and multiple possibilities for family forms, also involve
risks and chances and heartbreak. It is tempting to liken lesbian social parents
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req uired, and sometimes everything falls.
In the Michigan case, McG.uffin v. Overton & Porter, a lesbian social parent
was told by an appellate court that she did not ha ve standing under the state's
child custody legislation to apply for custody of two boys she had helped to
raise for eight years. Her life partner, their biological moth er, died in January
1995. Just prior to her death, the deceased mother had executed a will naming
her partner the guardian of the children. The biological mother indicated th at
she did not want their biological father to have custody because he had established no relationship with them . He was also $20,000 behind in child support
at the time of her death. Upon receiving notice of the surviving partner's application to be appointed the children's guardian, the father moved swiftly: he
obtained ex par te orders for custody of each of the boys, and at the end of
February he collected them from school and had them in his custody. Despite
the intervention of a children's law clinic urging that the boys be returned to
the home they had known for the last eight years, the Michigan appeal court
told Carol Porter that she did not have standing to apply for custody of the
boys. She would have to recommence her application to be named their
guardian (a difficult process, notwithstanding the testamentary instrument,
because the biological father could claim a more direct relationship).
In another American case, this one in New York, custody proceedings
involved what the court characterized as 'a unique set of facts' (In the Matter
of the Guardianship of Astonn H., 1995) . Astonn's mother, Margo, had died a
month after he was born, never having left the hospital after his birth. Astonn,
a baby with many special health-care needs, was released from hospital into
the care of Margo's life partner, Sofia. Sofia applied to be appointed Astonn's
guardian IO days after her partner's death. As it happened, Margo had been
married to, but separated from, the father of her older daughter (who was in
the de facto custody of her husband's mother) . The paternal grandmother
applied for custody of Astonn, even though her son was not Astonn's biological father. In support of her claim, t he (not quite) paternal grandmother argued
that the half-siblings should be raised together, and further that as she,
Ast onn's half-sister, and Astonn shared a common racial heritage, her home
was the more appropriate for him. The court observed:
In the instant proceedi ng the court is presented with an extraordinary combination of circumstances that must be weighed in determining who would be
the best caregiver for this child. The importance of race of the caregiver, the
significance of a party's physical custody of the subject child's half sibling and
the lesbian relationship between a party and the deceased biological mother,
including plans they made regarding the child are circumstances unique to this
proceeding that the court must consider. (1995 WL)
Sofia, the surviving lesbian social parent, was named th e child 's guardian and
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awa rded custody, with access to the grandmother and assurances that he and
his sister would be raised as closely together as possible.
These cases suggest that biological ties between child and parent or
caregiver pose the most difficult hurdle facing a lesbian parent. This hurdle is
insurmoun table in the absence of familial-neutral legislation (such as Ontario' s
children's legislation). Clearly, these (aspirant) lesbian 1nothers are not
mothers j ust like others. While Carol Porter found herself outside Michigan's
child custody law, this relegation was neither necessary nor inevitable (as the
experience in Ontario law suggests).
'Playing a Different Game on the 01.d. Court ':
Lesbian Couple Adoptions
IJ1 this last section, I want to examine a 1995 decision of the Ontario Court,

Provincial Division, Re K., which has been followed by the Ontario Court,
General Division, in Re C.(E.G.)(No. l ) and Re C.(E.G.)(No. 2) (1995) and in
several unreported lower court decisions. Effectively, lesbian adoption amounts
to 'playing a different game on the old court' {Cain, 1994: 42), for the fact of
adoption can establish legal parenthood for both partners of a lesbian couple.
In Ontario, in the aftermath of the defeat of Bill 167 and, in particular, in
response to the last ditch eleventh-hour compromise proposed by the AttorneyGeneral (to provide that gay and lesbian couples would not be able to adopt
child ren) (see Urse!, 1995) , four lesbian couples made joint applications to
adopt the children th ey were raising toget her. In each of the fou r cases, the
biological moth er consented to the application by the 'social parent '. However,
the only way they could make a joint application was to challenge t he hete.rosexual definition of spouse incorporated in Ontario's Child and Family Services
Act, 12 as only spouses are allowed by that legislation to make a joint application to adopt. Once the 'husband and wif e' dyad was struck, the lesbians had
then to establish themselves as both spouses and parents.
This they did in admirable fashion. A courageous piece of litigation
produced a courageous judgment and complete vindication of the position of
the lesbians before the court:
When one reflects on the seemingly limitless parade of neglected, abandoned
and abused children who appear in our courts in protection cases daily, all of
whom have been in the care of heterosexual parents i n a 'traditional' family
structure, the suggestion that it 1night not ever be in the best interests of
loving, caring and committed parents. who might happen to be lesbian or gay,
is nothing short of ludicrous. (per Nevins J in Re K. at 708)
The l esbian adoption cases are interesting because they have been test cases in
the truest sense of the term. They have been litigated by parties wh o have not
been hurled into court by an outraged former spouse or parent. Rather, they
have been marshalled with care and, while there have been many defeats (e.g.,
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Cami lla, N.Y. 1994; Dana, N.Y. 1995), the litigation has also produced some
startling judici al pronouncements. In a 1993 lesbian adoption case in New
Jersey, w here a lesbian couple had been in a committed relationship for 10
years, the biological mother of the child was an executive vice president for a
large communications company, the household income was in the low six
figures, and the extended families of both women were d escribed as
supportive and involved in the f our year old child's life, the trial judg e
concluded :
This case arises at a time of great cha nge and a lim e of recognition that , while
the families of the past may have seemed sin1ple formations repeated with
u niformity (the so-called 'traditional family') families have always been
complex, m ultifaceted, and often idealized .This court recognizes that families
differ in both size and shape within and among the m any cultural and socioeconomic layers that make up this society. We cannot continue to pretend that
there is one formula, one correct pattern that should constitute a family in
order to achieve the supportive, loving environment we believe children
should inhabit. This court finds that the family before it is providing a secure,
stable, and nurturing environment for the child. This is to be commended .
J.M .G. [the adoptive parent) is one of the two cornerstones of this supportive
home, and beyond all other issues it is upon this factor that t his court pri mar·
ily relies in granting this petition for adoption. (per Freed1nan P.J.S.C., Jn the
Marter of the Adoption of a Child by J.M. G., 1993)
Wit h respect to the issue of homophobia i n the broader community, this judge
observed:
if there is ever any hara ssment or community disapproval, this court should
have no role in supporting or tacitly approving such behavior. The court's
recogniti on of this family unit through the adoption can serve as a step in the
path towards which strong, loving families of all varieties deserve. (Ibid.)
The next year, in another lesbian adoption case, a New York judge addressed
the issu e of different fa m ily forms:
This Court is aware that these cases present family u nits many in our society
believe to be outside the mainstream of American f amily life. The reality,
however, is that most children today do not live in so·-called 'traditional' 1950
television situation comedy type families wi th a stay at ho1ne mother and a
father who works from 9:00 to 5:00. . . . It is unrealistic to p retend that
children can only be successf ully raised in an idealized concept of family, the
product of nostalgia for a time Jong past. The family environments presented
in these adoptio n cases are warm, loving and supportive, well·suited for the
nurturance of children. The Court is less concerned for the welfare of these
adoptive child ren than for many of the children of heterosexual parents \Yho
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find themselves before the Court. (per Sciolino J., In the Matter of' the Adoption
of Caitli n and Another (Adoption No. I); In the Matter of the Adoption of Adam
and Another (Adoption No. 2), N.Y. Fam. Ct, Monroe County, 1994)

In these cases, however, it is not enough for the lesbian social parents to be
'parents'. In order to make a joint application, and thereby preserve the biological mother's tie to the child(ren), they must also be spouses in Ontario, and
indeed in every province other than British Columbia. 13
Thus, as profound as the challenge of lesbian couple adoptions is, it is clear
that striking down the opposite sex requirement alone does not, cannot,
address the constraints and familial assumptions embedded in the adoption
legislation in Ontario. For the lesbian parents to be full parents, they bad to be
spouses, same-sex spouses to be sure, but spouses nonetheless. Perhaps then,
there is after all a (new) lesbian of legal discourse: the good spouse.

Conclusion
In this paper, I have attempted to illustrate the challenges experienced and
posed by lesbians who parent. There is no one kind of lesbian custody case,
and no simple or easily predictable judicial response. This also illustrates the
complex and contradictory nature of law-as discourse and practice-and its
uneven contributi on to gender relations. I have sought to illustrate th at legal
practice, legal and non-legal actors, and legal processes have to be factored into
any analysis of law as a gendering strategy.
In many provinces, including Ontario, a parent is defined to include social
parents (i.e., someone who has demonstrated a settled intention to treat a child
as a child of his or her own family) . In Ontario, a parent or any person may
apply for custody or access to a child-the neutral phrase, 'any person'.
helping grandparents and lesbian social parents alike. The significance of
gender-neutrality, and indeed familial-neutrality , to these family law provisions
should not be underestimated or misunderstood. Unlike the experience of some
lesbian social parents in the United States, lesbian partners and social parents
in Canada get into the front door of the courtroom and are not denied standing, custody, or access simply because they are lesbian. I am inclined to think
that, strategically, the better way for the lesbian social parents to proceed is not
to press for recognition as 'mother' but rather to continue to push for legisla·
tion that has opened up the possibility for recognition of the i1nportance of the
social nature of parenting. Feminists, lesbians, and mothers ought to move
away from the ideological (and patriarchal) appeal of 'mother', loosen its grip,
and continue to breathe lesbian content into the 'person' and 'parent ' of family
law legislation.
While it is enormously satisfying to see and hear the gnashing of teeth of the
self-styled pro-fan1ily right at the thought of lesbian legal victories, lesbian
adoptions, and the increasing acceptance of lesbian families, it is important
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that we interrogate and re-examine our places in and positions. on fan1ily law,
especially when we (at least some of us) win our cases. This may require some
rethinking of the place of gender-neutrality in the gendering of justice.
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